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2So how important is your mobile?
• Samsung Mobile (13 Oct 09) polled 300 people 
in 25 metropolitan areas…
– 38% of women nationally would rather 
give up sex for a year than give up their 
cell phone for the same period 
• 18% of men would do the same
• 1 in 7 Americans use only their cell phone and 
do not have a landline
– Harris Poll #36, 4 April 2009
• 15% of Japanese do not carry a wallet, cash or 
credit cards; only a mobile phone
– Forrester Research, 12 August 2009
3Points of Attack
from Chandra (2005)
4GSM (2G) Registration and 
Authentication
5GSM call interception
• One-way authentication gave rise to rogue 
BTS attacks
– Phone registers with strongest BTS signal
• Once a phone has registered with a rogue 
BTS, the rogue BTS can…
– Turn off encryption
– Relay call to legitimate BTS thus acting as 
MITM
– Enable GPS
– Conduct DoS (by not forwarding calls)
– Other nasty things
6UMTS/3G?
UMTS (3G) fixed this with 
two-way authentication,
but…





Where is the mobile industry 
going?



































































+ Downlink 100Mbps+                    
+ Uplink 20-50Mbps+
+ User <10msec latency
+ Flexible spectrum –
1.25-20MHz
+ FDD and TDD





+ New all IP collapsed 
architecture
+ Centralized mobility 
and application layer 
(IMS based)
+ E2E QOS
+ Access technology 
agnostic




WiMax is not WiFi on steroids!
WiMax WiFi
Synchronous framing Asynchronous framing
No specified carrier 
frequency
(License dependent from 2 – 10GHz)
Standardized carrier 
frequencies in 2.4 GHz 
and 5.8 GHz spectra
Variable bandwidths
(3.5, 5, 7, 10 MHz and more)
22.5 MHz bandwidth
100s of users 10’s of users
State-driven control Event-driven control
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If you don’t know what you’re 
looking for…
…finding a WiMax network is not easy!
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WiMax Background
• Envisioned as a 4G cell phone replacement 
technology (data first)
• Provides Corporate/Residential/Mobile broadband 
wireless access
– ~3-70 Mbps (modulation/code rate dependent)
• Think of as Wireless Cable Modem for residential 
customers
– Coverage area of a few km (density dependent)
– Mobility support  ~60kmph (802.16e-2005)
– ~100’s of “active” subscribers 
• Large network structures similar to those in current 
cellular deployments
• Attractive for developing countries without wired 
infrastructure 
– Rapidly deployable 









Expand mobile broadband market
Low Cost nationwide service
Full Mobility







Anywhere broadband for CE devices
Dual Mode (WiMAX/CDMA) handsets
Home/SoHo Broadband







WiMAX 16e Mobile 
Network
In the USA














Division of Warid Telecom (Abu Dhabi)
Nationwide WiMAX license (3.5 GHz) in Pakistan
Speedy Installation
Low Cost replacement to DSL
E2E network (IP NGN Core, IMS)
Nationwide service footprint












Wateen : First nationwide WiMAX 16e 




• Worldwide use of Wireless Broadband Networks
http://www.wimaxmaps.org/
























• Functional diagram of implementation model
Major Steve Schnur, USMC, MSEE, Sep 2009
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Geolocation of WiMax Signals
• Received Signal Strength
• Angle of Arrival
• Frequency Difference of Arrival
• Time Difference of Arrival
• Signal Internals































Ranging & Adjust Procedure
Allocate primary and basic 
CID, send ranging 
response packet
Send ranging packet in 
connection mode with CID = 0
Recognize its own MAC 
address and store the primary 
and basic CID adjust -
transmission parameters






• Management Message Type (MMT) 5
• Ranging Status 1 “Continue”
• Later contiguous bits:
Type # Bytes Values











• Potential for Better than 10x Improvement 
Over GSM TA Location Techniques
– 40m for WiMax vs. 400m for GSM
• RNG-RSP Successfully Received in 
Traffic
• Small Timing Adjust Variance in Repeated 
Observations
• Fixed WiMAX Techniques Directly 
Applicable to Mobile WiMAX
• Periodic and Handoff Ranging Can Add to 
Location Accuracy
WiMax Denial of Service




LPPD Jamming Signal Insertion
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Results
Full DOS occurs at:
-23 dBm LPPD Collision 
technique
-10 dBm Continuous Jamming
At -23 dBm point LPPD 
requires only 13% of 
the energy required by 
continuous jamming
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-Ideally using a randomly changing combination of SSs 2, 3 and 4 to hide its signal in theirs.
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Summary (so far)
• Identified method for finding a WiMax user 
and keeping him off the network
• A wide variety of operational options




VoIP in Cell Phones
• 4G phones will use VoIP.
• With VoIP comes all of the security issues 
associated with TCP/IP networks
– Moving from a highly controlled network (SS7) 
to a highly open network (Internet)
• Consequently, a myriad of attacks have 
been identified that are largely signaling 
standard-specific 
– H.323, SIP, MGCP, Skinny
38








All VoIP Technologies use 





• Vary RTP sequence number
• No replay prevention
• Vary Timestamp
• No replay prevention
• Signaling Protocol does not matter
(UDP checksum is only on header)
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What does varying the sequence number 
do?
• The sequence number indicates the order 
in which samples of voice were 
transmitted
• The receiver will discard any packets with 
sequence numbers older (less) than the 
last one received
• Attack vector: Sending spoofed content 
with sequence numbers greater than the 
legitimate content will cause the spoofed 
content to be heard and the legitimate 
content ignored
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What does this mean in terms of 4G phones?
Inserting packets into a synchronous 
4G link is extremely difficult
Does the attacker need to insert










• Trend is for increasing reliance on our 
mobile device
• Legacy mobile standards have significant 
security issues
• Identified some issues with 4G standards
• Additionally, reliance on VoIP in 4G 
standards introduces a entirely new 
domain of vulnerabilities
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Questions?
QUESTIONS?
